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Emmett v. Commonwealth
569 S.E.2d 39 (Va. 2002)
I. Faas
In late April 2001, Christopher Scott Emmett ("Emmett") andJohn Fenton
Langley ("Langley") were assigned to the same roofing project in the city of
Danville. Emmett and Langley shared a room at a local moteL On the evening
of April 26,2001, Emmett, Langley, and Nfichael Darryl Pittman ("Pittman") ate
dinner at the motel, drank beer, and played cards. During the course of these
events, Langleyloaned some moneyto Emmett and Pittman, both of whom used
the moneyto buy crack cocaine.'
Around 11:00 p.m. that evening, a member of the roofing crew heard "bang,
bang" noises from Emmett and Langley's room. Around midnight that same
evening, Emmett went to the motel office and asked the clerk to call the police.
Emmett told the clerk that he returned to his room and saw "blood and stuff.
.. and didn't know what had took [sic] place." The plice arrived at 12:46 a.m.
and accompanied Emmett back to his room. They found Langley's dead body
lying face-down on his bed and spattered blood on the sheets, headboard, the
wall behind the headboard, and on the wall between the bathroom and Emmett's
bed. The police also found a damaged brass lamp, stained with blood, under-
neath Langley's bed.2
Emmett initially told police that he had returned to the room and gone to
bed. He told the police that he discovered the blood and Langley's body when
he went to the bathroom later that night. The police observed bloodstains on
Emmett's personal effects, and they took possession of his boots and clothing
with Emmett's permission. Emmett suggested to the police that the blood might
be his own from an injury he sustained earlier in the week. Subsequent testing
revealed that his boots and clothing actually were stained with Langley's blood.
Later in the morning of April 27, 2001, Emmett voluntarily accompanied
police officers to the Danville police station. He agreed to be fingerprinted, and
he gave a sample of his blood. He also admitted that he had been drinking and
that he used cocaine the previous evening. During the next several hours,
Emmett told different versions of the events from the previous evening. He first
implicated Pittman as Langley's murderer. Emmett eventually told the police,
however, that he alone beat Langley to death with the lamp. The police gave
Emmett Miranda warnings, and he gave a full, taped confession in which he




stated that he and Pittman decided to rob Langley after Langley refused to lend
them additional moneyto purchase more cocaine. Emmett confessed to striking
Langley five or six times with the brass lamp. He also stated that he took
Langley's wallet and left the motel to buy cocaine.4
Emmett was indicted for capital murder and robbery.' The guilt-deternina-
tion phase of a bifurcated jurytrial began on October 9,2001. The Common-
wealth presented, in addition to the facts above, evidence from the medical
examiner indicating that Langley was not killed immediately by the first blow
from the lamp. The medical examiner admitted, however, that Langley might
have lost consciousness after the first blow and that Langley may have suffered
"brain death" before his actual death.
6
The jury convicted Emmett of capital murder and robbery?" During the
penalty-determination phase, the Commonwealth presented evidence of
Emmett's prior criminal historythat included an incident in which Emmett had
participated in an escape plan while he was incarcerated at a maximum-security
juvenile detention facility. The Commonwealth also presented evidence of an
involuntary manslaughter conviction that involved a motorcycle accident in
which Emmett said "that there was no need to worry about the man on the
motorcycle. He was already dead, and that [Emmett] could do nothing to help
him." '
In addition, the Commonwealth presented extensive victim-impact testi-
monyfrommembers of Langley's family, during the course of which some of the
family members appeared to urge the imposition of the death penalty. The trial
court sustained Emmett's objections to these statements and directed the juryto
disregard the statements. Emmett then presented mitigation evidence from his
family and a family friend.9
The jury returned its verdict recommending the death sentence. The jury
based its verdict on the statutoryaggravating factors of future dangerousness and
vileness. After consideration of a post-sentence report, the trial court imposed
the jury's sentence of death. 0
Emmett also was convicted of robbery and was sentenced to life imprison-
ment for that crime. He appealed his convictions, but on February 8, 2002, he
filed a motion to withdraw the appeal The Supreme Court of Virginia ordered
the trial court to determine if the waiver of appeal was voluntarily and intelli-
gentlymade. The trial court conducted the hearing on March 4, 2002, and found
4. Id at42-43.
5. Id at43;seVA.CODE ANN. 5 18.2-31(4) Michie Supp. 2002) (definngwllful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing in commission of robberyas capital murder).







that Emmett fullyunderstood the consequences of voluntarily waiving his right
to appeaL The Supreme Court of Virginia, pursuant to Section 17.1-313(A) of
the Virginia Code, reviewed the imposition of the death sentence.'2
. Hddirg
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that: (1) it would not consider the
merits of any assertion that evidence was improperly admitted or that the Con-
monwealth made improper statements to the jury, but that Emmett was entitled
to review of the sentence of death based on the impact of such evidence and
statements on the jury's sentencing decision;" (2) the sentence of death imposed
by the jury was not a result of passion, prejudice, nor other arbitrary factors;"
and (3) the sentence of death was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed
in similar cases." The court affirmed the sentence of death.
16
III A IJSL /Appcio in Vzia
A. Scope qfReziew
The Supreme Court of V'rginia first examined the extent of its review of the
case. The Commonwealth argued that Emmett's waiver barred him from
asserting that the death sentence was improperly imposed as a result of passion,
prejudice, or other arbitrary factors based on allegations that evidence was
erroneously admitted or on improper remarks made by the Commonwealth
during its penalty-phase dosing argument.' The court agreed that Emmett was
barred from asserting that the sentence of death was improper solely because
reversible error may have been committed at triaPls
Emmett, however, could not waive mandatory review by the court under
Section 17.1-313(Q(1) of the Virginia Code. 9 The court stated that mandatory
11. Idat42 nl.
12. Enma 569 S.E2d at 42;se VA. QODE ANN. S 17.1-313(A) (ivfchie 1999) (stating that
Supreme Court of Virginia shall review, on the record, sentence of death when such judgment has
become final).
13. Em 569 SE2d at 43-44; sw b#6z Part RI.A (describing court's holding on its scope
of review).
14. Entr 569 S.E2d at 44-45; swiI6 Part ImB (describing court's examination of jury's
findings).
15. Emm , 569 S.E.2d at 47; se#a - Part I.C (examining court's proportionality review).
16. Enm 569 S.E2d at 47.
17. Id at 43.
18. Id (quoting Akers v. Commonwealth, 535 SX.2d 674,677 (Va. 2000)); see VA. SUP. Cr.
R. 5.25 (stating that court shall not find error in trial court's ruling unless objection was stated with
reasonable certainty at time of ruling); se also VA. SUP. Cr. R. 5:17(c) (requiring appellant to list
secific error n 2rulings, upon which appellant intends to rely, under sepate head in petion
for appeal).
19. Ennu 569 SE.2d at 44; see VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(C)() (Michie Supp. 2002)
(requiring Supreme Court of Virginia to consider and determine whether sentence of death was
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review under Section 17.1-313(C)(1) would be meaningless unless it gave some
recognition that an error at trial may result in a prejudicial verdict." The court
therefore found that even when it is barred from finding reversible error in the
trial proceedings, it may still consider a sentence of death to be erroneous if it
finds that the sentence was imposed as a result of passion, prejudice, or other
arbitrary factors." As a result, the court refused to consider the merits of any
assertion of improperly admitted evidence or improper statements bythe Com-
monwealth, but considered the potential impact such evidence and statements
may have had on the decision to impose the sentence of death.2
B. Passi A~ud or Otx rA rbiray Fat
Emmett pointed to several factors to support his contention that the
sentence of death resulted from passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors: (1)
statements by the victim's family members appearing to urge a sentence of
death;2 (2) misstatements by the Commonwealth during closing arguments of
the penalty-determination phase; 4 (3) admission of autopsy photographs that
were unduly gruesome,5 (4) admission of his prior inconsistent statements in
which he denied his responsibility for the murder and shifted the blame to
someone else;26 and (5) insufficiency of evidence to find an aggravating factor
necessary under Section 192-264.2 of the Virginia Code.'
1. Tstdn Uigvg Serzmwne fDa
Emmett's primary argument was that the testimony of members of
Langley's family was emotionally charged and appeared to urge the imposition
of the death penalty28 Everytime such a statement was made, Emmett objected,
and the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the statement.29 The court
found that the disputed testimonies did not prejudice the juryin its death sen-
tence determination because a jury is presumed to follow the instructions of the
trial court.3" The court, however, did not note how often these statements were
imposed under influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor).
20. Ennr 569 S.E2d at 44.
21. Id
22. id
23. Id; see ira Part mI..1.
24. Enmt, 569 S.2d at 44; se irf Part I.B2.
25. Enmr 569 S.E2d at 45; se iru Part ILB.3.
26. Enmt, 569 SEld at 45; se irfu Part IMB.4.
27. Ennt 569 S.Ed at 45;swifmPartlI..5;VA.CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (lchie 2000)
(stating that sentence of death may not be imposed unless court or jury finds probability of future
dangerousness of defendant or vileness in defendants conduct in charged offense).
28. Em m,569 SE2d at 44.
29. Id
30. Id; seWeeks v. Angelone, 528 US. 225, 234 (2000) (holding that juries are presumed to
244 [Vol. 15:1
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made and objected to, or whether such frequency factored into its determina-
tion.'1
2 Conmusalzhs CksngA iyowsn Du~riig~ maly-arit Phse
Emmett also argued that misstatements by the Commonwealth during
closing arguments of the penalty-determination phase caused passion and
prejudice to control the jury's recommendation of his sentence. 2 Emmett
specifically cited three instances of prejudicial misstatement by the Common-
wealth. First, Emmett contended that the Commonwealth erred when it said that
any of the blows could have been fatal.33 The Commonwealth also incorrectly
made a reference to his prior conduct in a prison, when, in fact, the conduct
occurred in a maximum-security juvenile detention facility.3  Emmett further
alleged that the Commonwealth attempted to "inflame the jurors' passions" by
saying that "nobody is safe from this guy" and that he was dangerous because
"[hie has nothing to lose."3" Although the court agreed with Emmett regarding
the statements about the blows to Langley and the reference to "prison," the
court considered these misstatements to be minor.- The court found that the
statements were not undulyprejudicial because the trial court instructed the jury
that the argument of counsel was not evidence. 7 The court reviewed the Com-
monwealth's argument as a whole and found that the misstatements, individually
and cumulatively, did not create "an atmosphere of passion or prejudice that
influenced the jury's sentencing decision."
3. Awt.y Pbm ra
Emmett contended that crime scene and autopsyphotographs admitted into
evidence were unduly gruesome and inflamed te jury's passion in favor of
followinstructions and to understand W e's answers to questions); swhoLeVasseurv. Common-
wealth, 304 S.E2d 644,657 (Va. 1983) (fmding that improper question byCommonweakh during
guilt phase of trial was not prejudicial because trial court took prompt and decisive action).
31. The opinion also did not note whether the prosecutor mayhave elicited these statements
from the witnesses. If the prosecutor had done so, grounds may have existed for prosecutorial
misconduct. SwRobinson v. Commonwealth, 413 S.E2d 885, 888 (Va. Q. App. 1992) (reversing
trial court's denial of motion for mistrial because Commonwealh repeatedly asked questions that
were highy prejudicial despite defendant's constant objections, all of which were sustained).






38. Enr 569 S.E2d at 44; seBums v. Gommonwealth, 541 S.E2d 872, 896 (Va. 2001)
(fiding that Commonwealth's statement that defendant was an "animal" during dosing argument
ofenydetermination phase of tl and argument to juythat decision w send a message"
did not create atmosphere of passion or prejudice that influenced sentencing decision).
20021
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imosing a sentence of death. 9 The court agreed that the photos were shocking
an gruesome.40 The court, however, considered the photographs to be an
accurate depiction of the crime scene 1 The court stated that the condition of
the victim was "relevant to show motive, intent, method, malice, premeditation,
and the atrociousness of the crimes. '4
The court, citing Payw v Cwnmn edA also stated that the photographs
were relevant to show the likelihood of Emmett's future dangerousness."
Neither the court in PRy, nor the court in Enmmt however, elaborated on why
such evidence was relevant to show a likelihood of future dangerousness.
Without any elaboration by the court, defense attorneys may have difficulty
arguing against the admission of any overly gruesome evidence or identifying its
prejudicial effect.
4. Prior lmnwistet Stawemns to Pdie
Emmett argued that admission of his prior statements, in which he denied
responsibility for the rmurder and attempted to shift the blame to Pittman, was
undulyprejudicial 45 The court found that the statements "were clearlyrelevant
to show Emmett's consciousness of guilt" because a defendant's false statements
are robative of a defendant's attempts to conceal his guilt and, as a result, are
evidence of his guilt.6 The court did not find anyimnproperpurpose on the part
of the Commonwealth in introducing the evidence, and it found no support in
the record to find that the jury was unduly influenced by the evidence in its
sentencing consideration.47
5. IrmEiy qTzider mto Fwd AzrazingFatos
Emmett contended that the evidence was insufficient to show that either
future dangerousness or vileness existed in the case and that, as a result, the jury's
sentence must have resulted from passion, prejudice, or other arbitary factors.4 '
39. Enm 569 S.E.2d at 45.
40. Id
41. Id
42. Id; sESte'wart v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d 394,403 (Va. 1993) (holding that evidence
is not inadmissible merely because it is gruesome or shocking, provided that it is "relevant 'to show
motive, intent, method, malice, premedtation and the atrociousness of the crimes'" (quoting
Spencer v. Commonwealh, 384 S.E2d 785, 796 (Va. 1989))).
43. 509 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 1999).
44. Enn 569 S.E2d at 45; sE Payne v. Commonwealth, 509 S.E2d 293, 297 (Va. 1999)
(stating that shocking and gruesome photographs and videotapes were relevant to show likelihood
of defendant's future dangerousness.
45. Enmm 569 S.E2d at 45.
46. Id (citing false statement standard in Roflston v. Commonwealth, 399 S.E.2d 823, 831
(Va. 0.. App. 1991)).
47. Id
48. Id; see S 19.2-264.2 (stating that sentence of death may not be imposed unless court or




The court found that the Commonwealth introduced sufficient evidence for
the future dangerousness predicate.49 The court relied on several pieces of
evidence introduced by the Commonwealth to support its decision. The court
first cited evidence of his prior participation in an escape from a maximum-
security juvenile detention facility." This incident also included an assault on a
guard." The court also relied on a subsequent conviction of Emmett for invol-
untary manslaughter, his lack of remorse for this crime, and his lack of remorse
for the instant killing of a co-worker. 2 Finally, the court cited Emmett's state-
ment that he killed Langley simply because it "just seemed right at the time.""
The court found that Emmett lacked regard for human life and that the evidence
left little doubt of the probability of future dangerousness."
h Vils
The court found that the evidence supported two alternative circumstances
supporting a finding of vileness." It first found that Emmett's use of the brass
lamp "to batter the skull of the victim repeatedly and with such force that blood
spatterfed] several feet from the victim" met the aggravated battery standard
because it was "qualitatively and quantitatively more force than the minimum
necessaryto kill [Langley]."' The court also stated that the murder was a violent
attack of a co-worker, with whom Emmett had apparently been amicable."' The
court found that the evidence established Emmett's depravity of mind. 8 The
charged offense).






55. Ernwz 569 SE.2d at 45; se also S 19.2-264.2(1) (stating that court or jury may not
impose sentence of death unless it finds that defendants conduct in committing charged offense
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind, oran aggravated batteryto victim); Goins v. Commonwealth, 470 SE2d 114,131 (Va. 1996)
(holding that proof of any of three components listed in Section 192-2642 will support finding of
vileness.
56. Emta 569 SE.2d at 45; see Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978)
(construing "'aggraated batter/ to mean a battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more
culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder").
57. Emr 569 S.E2d at 45.
58. Id at 45-46; seeasoSni, 248 S.E2d at 149 (construing "depravityof mind'... to mean
a degree of moral turpitude and psychic2l debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of
ordinary legal malice and premeditation").
2002] 247
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court therefore rejected Emmett's claim that the evidence was insufficient to find
an aggravating factor necessaryto support a sentence of death. 9
C Prqonicfnliy jSetier to Pm zti Inp a in Sinilar Ce
Section 17.1-313(C)(2) of the Virginia Code requires the court to determine
whether the sentence of death was excessive or disproportionate to the penalties
imposed in similar cases, taking into account both the crime and the defendant.'
Emmett presented two reasons whythe death sentence was inappropriate under
this section: (1) the review was inadequate because the comparison base unfairly
favored a sentence of death;61 and (2) the majority of capital murder convictions
in which robbery was the gradation offense resulted in life sentences.62 Defense
counsel should be especially aware of the court's statements in these sections.
1. A dViay jRezew
Section 17.1-313(E) of the Virginia Code states that the court "mayaccumu-
late... records of all capital felony cases tried within such (a] period of time as
the court maydetermine." 63 This section also requires the court to consider such
records as are available to guide its determination of whether the sentence
imposed is excessive." Emmett argued that the review was inadequate and
unfairly skewed the comparison base in favor of a death sentence because the
court did not collect, for its proportionalityreview, records of unappealed capital
murder convictions that resulted in life sentences6 The court, however, relied
on its holding in Baiey v Cwmm k1' to reject Emmett's argument and find
that it had the discretion to determine what records to compile for its review.
67
The court also focused on other language in Bai/eyin which the court stated
that it had the discretion to determine what records to accumulate for review"'so
long as the methods employed assure that the death sentence is not dispropor-
59. En , 569 SE.d at 45.
60. Id at 46; seeVA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(Q(2) (Nchie 1999) (requiring Supreme Court
of Virginia to consider and determine "whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportion-
ate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant").
61. Enrgi, 569 S.E2d at 46; see bim, Part IC1.
62. Ent, 569 S.E2d at 46; see i Part IC2.
63. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(E) (Michie 1999).
64. Id
65. Ennr 569 S.E.2d at 46.
66. 529 S.E2d 570 (Va. 2000).
67. Emra 569S.E2dat46;swBaileyv. Commonwealh,529S.E2d570,580-81(Va.2000)
(finding that statute and case law did not prescribe method for conducting proportionality review
of death sentence and that Supreme Court of Virginia had discretion to determine what records to




tionate to the penalty generally imposed for comparable crimes.'"" The court,
however, did not explain how it could asswte that the methods it employs are not
disproportionate to generallyimposed penalties for comparable crimes while, at
the same time, it limits the body of cases it reviews. The court reached this
conclusion despite the language of Section 17.2-313(E), which states, "The
Supreme Court may accumulate the records of a# capital felony cases tied....
The court shidl consider such records as are available as a guide in determining
whether the sentence imposed in the case under reviewis excessive." 69 Although
it was clearlywithin the court's power to collect cases that were tried and resulted
in life sentences, and to develop a body of facts from those trial records, the
court declined to do so.
The court, both in Efnn and R14 never specificallyaddressed Emnett's
assertion that the comparison base was unfairly skewed. It only qualified its
record-gathering system bystating that Section 17.1-313(E) did not require it to
collect data from unappealed cases!0 Defense attorneys should note the court's
vagueness on this issue and argue that such limitation on the body of cases the
court reviews cannot possibly assure that a death sentence is not disproportion-
ate to the penalty generally imposed for comparable crimes.
2. Awtyq t fiSen w
With Rdivyz P, &aat Cnnr
The court stated that Emmett presented evidence showing that, of the fifty
most recent capital murder appeals in the Supreme Court of Vuginia, twenty-six
of the convictions contained robbery as the predicate crime." Of those twenty
six convictions, seventeen resulted in life sentences.' Emmett also argued that
the facts of those seventeen "life cases" were comparable or similar to the facts
of his own case, and, in some cases, were even more egregious. 3 The court
rejected Emmett's argument, stating that its proportionalityanalysis encompasses
"a& a pira ntrker az&e* presented to the court for review and "[was] not limited
to cases selectively chosen by a defendant." 4 It further stated that its test was
68. Emrr 569 S.E.2d at 46 (quoting BaleK 529 S.E.2d at 581).
69. VA. GODE ANN. S 17.1-313(E) (emphasis added).
70. Etz, 569 S.E.2d at 46.
71. Id The court's statement is incorrect. Emmett's evidence actuallyconsisted of the fifty
most recentlyappealed capital murder convictions and was not limited to those appeals that reached
the Supreme Court of Virginia. Appellant's Attachment A at 1-3, Ernt 569 S.E.2d at 39. Most
of the "life" cases in Emmett's attachment did not reach the Supreme ourt. Id
72. Errm 569 S.E2d at 46.
73. Id
74. Id (emphasis added); gr S17.1-313(C)(2) (stating that court shal consider and determine
whether sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to penalty imposed in sinlar cases,
considering buh crime and defendant).
2002]
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whether "gwrrlly" juries in the jurisdiction impose the death sentence for "camduc
sirniar" to that of the defendant."
The court justified the above statements bystating that its method of review
enabled it to identifya death sentence that is excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases. 6 The court also stated that "[t]he purpose of
performing a comparative review is not to search for proof that a defendant's
death sentence is perfectly symmetrical with others, but to identifyand invalidate
a death sentence that is aberrant."' The court, however, never elaborated on
how it could identify an excessive or disproportionate penalty despite its failure
to use similar cases to achieve a dearer comparison. The court actually broad-
ened the definition of "comparative review" in order to reject Emmett's evi-
dence.' Its definition, however, appears to be in direct conflict with the stan-
dards set forth in Section 17.2-313(C)(2)." The court either ignored the "similar
cases" standard required by statute and case law, or it considered all capital
murder cases to be "similar."
The court continued by stating that Emmett's statistical analysis did not
suffice for its proportionality analysis."0 In the court's opinion, Emmett's
conclusions from his statistical analysis were "an overly simplistic and unwar-
ranted application of the proportionality review process."" The court then laid
out the factors it used to narrow the focus in determining proportionality.
82
75. Ent, 569 S.Eld at 46 (citing Stamperv. Commonwealth, 257 S1Ed 808, 824 (Va.
1979)) (emphasis added). The court also stated that 'the question of proportionality does not turn
on whether a given capital murder case 'equals] in horror the worst possible scenario yet encoun-
tered.'" Id (citing Turner v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E2d 483,490 (Va. 1988)).
76. Id (citing Orbe v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 808, 817 (Va. 1999)). In fact, the court
has not found my death sentence, to date, to be excessive or disproportionate. Se Kelly E.P.
Bennett, Ptniw1yRaiew 7heHistriadApp&ia narDqidmi, 12 CAP.DEF.J. 103,107 (1999)
(stating that no death sentence has been reversed on the grounds of proportionalit); SW aso
Morrisette v. Commonwealth, 569 SE.2d 47,56 (Va. 2002) (concluding that sentence of death was
not excessive or disproportionate); Patterson v. Commonwealth, 551 S.E2d 332, 336 (Va. 2001)
(holding same); Yarbrough v. Commonweh, 551 SE.2d 306, 312 (Va. 2001) (holding same);
Remington v. Commonwealth, 551 S.E2d 620,638 (Va. 2001) (holding same); Schmitt v. Com-
monweakh, 547 SE.2d 186,204 (Va. 200(11 (holding same); Lenz v. Commonwealth, 544 S.E2d
299, 311 (Va. 2001) (holding same); Bums v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872, 897 (Va. 2001)
(holding same); Lovitt v. Commonweah, 537 S.E2d 866,881 (Va. 2000) (holding same); Atkins
v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E2d 312,321 (Va. 2000) (hoklingsame);Johnsonv. Commonwealh, 529
S.E2d 769,786 (Va. 2000) (holding same).
77. Eni 569 S.E.2d at 46 (citing G&, 519 S.E.2d at 817).
78. Id
79. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(C)(2) (requiring courttoexamine similar cases "considering
both the crime and the defendant-).
80. Enm 569 SE2d at 46-47.
81. Id at 46.
82. Id at 46-47.
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aPnwlzaa- Grati Clare or Staa qDqfmt or Victim
The court made two statements in one sentence that are worth noting. It
first stated that it included consideration of the predicate gradation offense in
narrowing its focus. 3 This statement, however, contradicts the court's rejection
of Emmett's claims. The court considered a/1 capital murder cases- without
regard to gradation predicate- presented to it for review. 4 The court, therefore,
either did not actually consider the predicate gradation offense or it made the
predicate gradation offense a minor consideration.
The court also stated that it considered the "status of the defendant or
victim that elevates a murder to a capital crime." 5 The court's language in this
statement is either confusing or frightening. It neither defines "status" nor does
it elaborate on how such status may justify a death sentence. It is possible that
the court referred to the "status" of a victim in terms of whether the victim
meets a statutory standard, such as being a law-enforcement officer, pregnant
woman, or person under the age of fourteen. 6 If the court defines "status "in
this way, then proportionality review is limited to a review of only the evidence
that qualifies the murder as a capital crime anyway. This standard would render
proportionality review meaningless. It is also possible that the court referred to
the "status" of a victim in terms of non-statutory standards, such as social
standing. This standard would be even worse, for it would indicate that factors
such as the wealth, occupation, or even race of a victim drive the court's
analysis. 7 Similarly, the "status" of a defendant may have been in reference to
whether the defendant was an abductor, rapist, or terrorist, for example. 8 Again,




86. SeVA. GODE ANN. S 18.2-31(6) (Mlchie Supp. 2002) (defining "[tihe willful, deliberate,
and premeditated kiling" of law-enforcement officer as capital murder); VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-
31(11) aije Sup. 2002) (defining "[tihe willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of a pregnant
woman byone who knows that the woman is pregnant and has the intent to cause the involuntary
termination of the woman's pregnancy without a live birth" as capital murder); VA. CODE ANN. S
182-31(12) (lwhie Supp. 2002) (defining "(tihe willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of a
person under the age of fourteen by a person age twenty.-one or olde9' as capital murder).
87. This standard would essentially state that a death sentence would be proportional if the
victim was a "decent" person, but that a death sentence would be disproportionate if the victim was
"indecent" (for example, if the victim was homeless, a prostitute, or a drug addict).
88. SeVA. CODE ANN. S 182-31(1) (blchie Supp. 2002) (defining "[the willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing of anyperson in the commission of abduction ... when such abduction
was committed with the intent to extort money or a pecuniary benefit or with the intent to defile
the victim of such abduction" as capital muder); VA. CODE ANN. S 182- 31(5) (Michie Supp. 2002)
(defining "[t]he willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of, or
subsequent to, p or attempted rape, forcible sodomy or attempted forcible sodomy or objectsexualpenetrationr as capalmurder); VA.CODE ANN. S182-31(13) (Mfichie Supp. 2002) (defining
'[the willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of anyperson by another in the commission of or
attempted commission of an act of terrorism as capital murder).
2002]
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murder becomes a capital crime only when the defendant is identified as an
abductor, rapist, or terrorist.
No matter how "status" is defined, and no matter to whom it applies, the
court's use of "status" for purposes of proportionalityreview sets a verydanger-
ous standard. If "status" is defined bystatutoryterms, then "status" can be used
twice against a defendant (once to bump the murder to capital murder and once
to declare the sentence of death proportional). If "status" is defined by non-
statutory terms, then the court places itself in a position in which it identifies
classes of victims whose deaths deserve more "redemption" than less valuable
victims.
h JOdxerFa= n"
The court also stated that it took other factors into account in order to
narrow its focus to determine proportionality 9 The court listed, but did not
restrict itself to, such factors as method of killing, motive for the crime, relation-
ship between the defendant and the victim, aggravating factors found by the
sentencing body, and whether there was premeditation.' The premeditation
factor listed bythe court is the most troublesome of all the factors. If prernedita-
tion is a factor in a proportionality analysis, then, because ad! capital murders
require a finding of premeditation, the court cannot possiblynarrow its focus.9'
The premeditation factor would make all capital murder convictions essentially
similar in much the same waythat statutorily-defined "status" would. Anydeath
sentence is therefore proportionate to all other death sentences because premedi-
tation was required to obtain the underlying capital conviction. This standard
would make it almost impossible for defense attorneys to conduct a proportion-
ality analysis for the benefit of the defendant.
The court concluded that it fulfilled the statutoryimandate to consider both
the crime (the "other factors") and the defendant (the "status" analysis)9  The
court stated that Emmett's reliance on the most recent capital murder cases
appealed to the court with robbery as the gradation offense was not a probative
selection of prior cases.93 It considered Emmett's analysis to be an "incidental
ratio that has little or no bearing on the crime or the defendant in this case,"
despite his contention that the facts of his cited cases were comparable or similar
to the facts of his own case.9 The court did not explain whyEmmett's citations
were an "incidental ratio," why they were not a "probative selection of prior
cases," or whyits broad analysis was a more probative selection.
89. En 569 S.E2d at 46-47.
90. Id
91. Seegm-yVA. CDE ANN. S 18.2-31 (def'ming all capital murders as willfulprmtai
and deliberate Iigs).





c 7he Ow's PrqtztyReuew
The court conducted what it considered "the appropriate proportionality
review" and found that other sentencing bodies generally imposed the death
penalty for comparable or similar crimes." The court, without explaining why
it considered these cases to be comparable or similar crimes, cited Aken v
Ccmwmih,' Grhvm v Canrnua&W, Watim v Cavn=wdl, Sta u
nm adth," Watkim v Ca mtazld, and P mr v C wmnztA "',101 to
support its finding."' The court, however, did not mention that each case,
except Aken, was decided before the abolition of parole in Virginia and the
subsequent rulings on the "life means life" instruction. 3 This factor would
appear to be crucial to any analysis involving similarityof cases for proportional-
95. Id
96. 535 S.E2d 674 (Va. 2000).
97. 459 S.E2d 97 (Va. 1995).
98. 385 SE2d 50 (Va. 1989).
99. 376 Sl.2d 288 (Va. 1989).
100. 331 S.E2d 422 (Va. 1985).
101. 329 S.E2d 815 (Va. 1985).
102. Enrrfr, 569 S.E.2d at 47; seeAlers v. Commonwealh, 535 S.E2d 674,677 (Va. 2000)
(finding that defendant's lack of remorse and statement that he would commit further acts of
violence, if alloved, indicated trial court's sentencing decision was not result of passion, prejudice,
or other arbitrary factor); Graham v. Commonwealth, 459 S.E2d 97,102 (Va. 1995) (finding that
record did not show jurywas influenced byarbit'aryfactors and that juy's findings of vileness and
future dangerousness were suported byevidence); Watkins v. Commonwealth, 385 S.2d 50,57
(Va. 1989) (finding that defendant's sentence was not racially prejudicial and that defendant
conceded sentence was not disproportiona.D; Stout v. Commonwealh, 376 SE.2d 288,293-94 (Va.
1989) (finding that defendant who posed as customer and could have taken moneyand fled without
harming victim or inflicting five-inch gash in her neck sufficiently displayed evidence of vileness);
Watkins v. Commnvea, 331 S.E2d 422, 436 (Va. 1985) (finding that evidence of defendant's
involvement in earlier murder, tether with prior felonyconvictions, was sufficien to support juryfinding of future dangerousness); Poyzer v. Commonwealth 329 S.E2d 815, 834 (Va. 1985)
(finding that evidence supported juryfinding of future dangerousness because "[a]fter a long career
of crime, defendant graduated to repeated acts of violence and relentless killing).
103. SeVA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (lchie 2002) (stating that anypersonsentenced to term
of incarceration for felony offense committed on or after January 1, 1995, shall not be eligible for
parole upon that offense); VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.4 (Michie 2000) (stating that, upon request
ydefendant, shall be instructed that for all Class 1 felonies committed after January 1, 1995,
defendants notbe eligibleforparole if sentenced to iprisonment for life); Simmons v. South
Carolina, 512 US. 154,169 olding that trial court's refusal in sentencing phase of capital
murder conviction either to allow defendant to present evidence of ineligibility for parole or allow
instruction to jury that defendant was ineligible for parole violated defendant's due process when
prosecutor sought sentence of death based on future dangerousness); Yarbrough v. Common-
wealh, 519 SEd 602, 616 (Va. 1999) (holding that in penaltydetermination phase after capital
murder conviction, trial court must give instruction, upon defendant's proffer, that "imprisonment
for lfe" means "imprisonment for life vithout possibilityof parole"); swa&oMatthewK. Mahoney,




ity review, and defense counsel should emphasize this point in anyproportional-
ity analysis argument.04
IV. Ca7G n
The court's analysis should raise a number of concerns among defense
attorneys. The court based many of its conclusions on very broad standards,
particularly in its proportionality analysis, and it also failed to define specifically
many of the standards it used or how they were applied. After allowing for the
applicability of disputed evidence for its mandatory review, it showed a great
reluctance in placing any weight on Emmett's arguments. The court's use of
such factors as "status" and premeditation, for the purposes of proportionality
review, and its analysis as a whole, further the belief that the court is unlklyever
to find a death sentence disproportionate.
Philip H Yoon
104. Se Cynthia K Brce, PmpwknzmUityaew Stl Inidquaz4 Bse Sdl Ner 14 CAP.
DEF. J. 265, 278-79 (2002) (examining applicability of cases decided before life means life*
requirement to proportionality review).
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